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vAbstract 
Nonprofit Earned Revenue Strategies: Refugee Services of Texas Case Study 
Jennifer Morgan LaMotte, MPAff, MSSW 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2019 
Supervisor:  David Spring 
Co-Supervisor: Calvin Streeter 
This report examines nonprofit earned revenue strategies, using local Austin 
nonprofit Refugee Services of Texas as a case study. Many nonprofits turn to earned 
income as a strategy to diversify their revenue sources and reduce dependence on grants 
and donations. Earned revenue offers a source of unrestricted income, or funding that is 
not contractually tied to a specific program or service. This report examines Refugee 
Services of Texas’ current efforts to develop an earned revenue strategy and provides 
recommendations for future earned revenue growth. Analysis and recommendations are 
based on a review of the literature on nonprofit revenue diversification and earned 
income, as well as four comparison case studies informed by conversations with local 
nonprofit leaders.  
 vi 
Table of Contents 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................... viii 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................ ix 
Introduction..................................................................................................................... 1 
Refugee Services of Texas Agency Background .............................................................. 3 
Literature Review ............................................................................................................ 8 
Revenue Diversification ......................................................................................... 9 
Earned Revenue as a Revenue Diversification Strategy ........................................ 11 
Legal Status .......................................................................................................... 14 
Theorizing Dual Purpose Organizations................................................................ 15 
Categorizing Nonprofit Earned Revenue Models .................................................. 18 
Mission Alignment ............................................................................................... 22 
Local Case Studies ........................................................................................................ 25 
Case Study 1: EcoRise Texas ............................................................................... 26 
Case Study 2: College Forward ............................................................................ 29 
Case Study 3: Catholic Charities of Forth Worth .................................................. 31 
Case Study 4: Multicultural Refugee Coalition ..................................................... 33 
Analysis ........................................................................................................................ 36 
Mission Alignment ............................................................................................... 36 
Organizational Context and Leadership ................................................................ 38 
Organizational Culture ......................................................................................... 39 
Refugee Services of Texas Case Study .......................................................................... 42 
Initial Project Development .................................................................................. 42 
 vii 
Decision to Pivot .................................................................................................. 43 
Impact Academy Business Planning Process ........................................................ 45 
Immigration Legal Services Financial Model........................................................ 46 
Recommendations for Refugee Services of Texas and Future Research ......................... 54 
Refugee Services of Texas .................................................................................... 54 
Recommendations for Future Research ................................................................. 58 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 61 
Appendices ................................................................................................................... 63 
Appendix A .......................................................................................................... 63 
References .................................................................................................................... 64 
 viii 
List of Tables 
Table 1: Refugee Services of Texas FY 2017 Revenue Sources ....................................... 4 
Table 2: Refugee Admissions Ceilings and Regional Allocations FY 2008-2019. ............ 5 
Table 3: P&L Model 1................................................................................................... 47 
Table 4: P&L Model 2................................................................................................... 48 
Table 5: P&L Model 3................................................................................................... 50 
Table 6: Final P&L Model............................................................................................. 51 
 ix 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Social Enterprise Spectrum............................................................................. 12 
Figure 2: Fitzgerald & Shepherd, 2018, p. 484 .............................................................. 17 
Figure 3: Battilana & Lee, 2014, p. 426 ......................................................................... 20 
Figure 4: Young et a., 2010, p. 161. ............................................................................... 23 
Figure 5: Earned Revenue Venn Diagram...................................................................... 37 






Many nonprofits struggle to keep up with annual grant cycles, raise sufficient 
individual donations, or secure government contracts in a changing political environment. 
Austin, Texas has the greatest per capita number of nonprofits of any metropolitan 
statistical area in the Southwest, and organizations compete for limited resources. Many 
nonprofits turn to earned income as a strategy to diversify their revenue sources and 
reduce dependence on grants and donations. Earned revenue offers a source of 
unrestricted income, or funding that is not contractually tied to a specific program or 
service. Many nonprofits are drawn to earned revenue as a strategy to increase financial 
stability and mitigate the effects of changing economic and political conditions on 
funding availability.  
This report explores nonprofit earned revenue strategies and social enterprises, 
using local Austin nonprofit Refugee Services of Texas as a case study. Earned revenue 
can take many forms, including: fee-for-service programs; selling a licensed software 
package, training, or school curriculum; or operating a small business that provides 
workforce development opportunities. While the literature lacks consensus and 
conceptual clarity in defining social enterprise, the term generally describes an 
organization, program, or company that pairs business principals with a social mission. 
This report focuses specifically on nonprofit organizations, and uses the terms social 
enterprise and earned revenue or earned income strategy interchangeably to describe 
nonprofits that engage in some type of commercial activity with the goal of generating 
profits that support the organization’s social mission. 
Refugee Services of Texas (RST) identified revenue diversification through social 
entrepreneurship as a key initiative in its 2015-2020 strategic plan. In 2018, RST applied 
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for a capacity building program designed to help nonprofits implement or grow an earned 
income strategy. It was one of three organizations selected to participate in Mission 
Capital’s Impact Academy, which provided RST with over four months of support from a 
team of private sector Social Venture Partners with expertise in marketing, accounting 
and finance, and operations. My participation in the Impact Academy team as a graduate 
intern with RST formed a large part of this Professional Report project, allowing me to 
experience firsthand the process and challenges of growing an earned income strategy. 
The research, data analysis, financial modeling, and planning I did for the Impact 
Academy project inform the recommendations and analysis in this report.  
In addition to participating in the Impact Academy program with RST, I had the 
opportunity to attend two of Mission Capital’s day-long Revenue Generator workshops 
on earned income. With guidance from LBJ School of Public Affairs professor and 
impact investor John Thornborrow, I also conducted informational interviews with four 
local nonprofit leaders, and I toured Multicultural Refugee Coalition’s (MRC’s) textile 
manufacturing social enterprise, Open Arms Studio. The four nonprofits whose leaders I 
interviewed – EcoRise, College Forward, Catholic Charities of Fort Worth, and MRC – 
are analyzed as comparison case studies. I also conducted a comprehensive literature 
review on nonprofit revenue diversification and earned income. Lessons from both the 
comparison case studies and the literature review are applied to Refugee Services of 




Refugee Services of Texas Agency Background 
Refugee Services of Texas (RST) is a nonprofit organization whose mission is to 
welcome and support refugees, asylees, and survivors of human trafficking through 
principles of human compassion and dignity (RST, n.d.). RST was founded in 1978 and 
operates state-wide in Texas with offices in Amarillo, Austin, Dallas, Fort Worth, 
Houston, and the Rio Grande Valley. In additional to resettling refugees, RST also helps 
asylum seekers and other immigrants, survivors of human trafficking, and 
unaccompanied immigrant children. The organization offers numerous programs across 
its six offices, including English language education, job readiness and placement 
services, social adjustment services, counseling, housing assistance, medical case 
management, immigration legal services, cultural orientation, and more. Texas is second 
only to California as the state resettling the highest number of refugees (Radford & 
Connor, 2016).  
Most of the programs RST operates are funded by three federal agencies: The 
Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), within the U.S. Department of Health & Human 
Services’ Administration for Children and families; the U.S. Department of State’s 
Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration; and the U.S. Department of Justice’s 
Office for Victims of Crime (see Appendix A). While RST receives some funding 
directly from the Department of Justice’s Office for Victims of Crime (OVC), most 
federal grants are administered by a complex network of intermediaries that varies across 
regions and programs. Many programs, including employment services, Refugee Cash 
Assistance, and Refugee Social Services, were previously administered through a state-
run refugee resettlement office. During the Fall of 2016, however, Texas withdrew from 
the program, forcing ORR to develop a network of “Regional Replacement Designees” to 
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administer contracts with local service providers (Lopez, 2017). Other ORR-funded 
programs have long been administered by a separate network of national intermediaries 
including Catholic World Service, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, and 
Episcopal Migration Ministries. 
According to the organization’s 2017 financial reporting, over 95% of RST’s 
funding came from government grants and contracts.  
 
FY 2017 Revenues 
Revenue Source   
Government Grants and Contracts  $           18,434,354  97.7% 
Program Income  $                183,996  1.0% 
Contributions  $                  51,223  0.3% 
In-kind contributions  $                195,852  1.0% 
Total Revenues  $           18,865,425   
              Table 1: Refugee Services of Texas FY 2017 Revenue Sources 
In Fiscal Year 2017, RST managed at least 28 separate federal contracts. This reliance on 
government contracts, each of which comes with its own reporting and monitoring 
requirements, adds immense complexity to the organization’s management. It also limits 
flexibility, as each funding stream is tied to specific programs and service. Heavy 
reliance on government funding also leaves the organization vulnerable to political 
changes, which has been of particular concerns since the 2016 election. Much of RST’s 
funding is subject to federal refugee resettlement levels. Each year, these levels are set by 
a presidential determination, which the president issues following congressional 
consultation on an initial proposal. Table 2 shows the current trajectory of refugee 
resettlement levels compared with the past decade (Bruno, 2018). While refugee 
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resettlement levels are reaching a historical low, the global need for refugee services 
remains extraordinarily high.  
 
   Table 2: Refugee Admissions Ceilings and Regional Allocations FY 2008-2019 
(Bruno, 2018). 
With 68.5 million forcibly displaced people worldwide, it is likely that RST will return to 
higher levels of refugee resettlement under a future presidential administration (UNHCR, 
2017). Meanwhile, RST continues to provide essential ongoing services to refugees who 
have already been resettled in Texas and to asylum seekers and survivors of human 
trafficking.  
Refugee Services of Texas is currently exploring earned revenue strategies as part 
of a broad plan to diversify its funding sources. Developing earned revenue opportunities 
is one of the key strategic initiatives identified in the organization’s 2015-2020 
comprehensive five-year strategic plan. Through its strategic planning process, RST 
identified earned revenue/social enterprise initiatives as an important contributor to 
fulfilling its four major goals: to serve, sustain, strengthen and engage. A successful 
earned revenue strategy will adhere to RST’s commitment to provide excellent services; 
will make the organization more financially sustainable; will build the organization’s 
capacity to expand and develop programs; and will further engage community members, 
clients, and other stakeholders in the organization’s work. RST’s efforts to diversify 
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revenues are not limited to social entrepreneurship alone; the organization also recently 
hired a development director and is ramping up its development team and infrastructure.  
In January 2019, Refugee Services of Texas was selected to participate in Mission 
Capital’s “Impact Academy” based on its proposal to implement a new earned revenue 
initiative. Mission Capital is a nonprofit based in Austin, TX that supports nonprofits and 
community leaders “advancing equity and opportunity through their work” (Mission 
Capital, n.d.). Impact Academy is a five-month program that “connects nonprofits with 
Social Venture Partners (SVPs) to examine organizational growth and sustainability 
through earned revenue, and develop a business plan to launch, accelerate or scale their 
programs or services” (Hartness, 2018). Social venture partners are business leaders and 
social entrepreneurs who engage with the nonprofits Mission Capital supports in a wide 
variety of ways including coaching, impact investing, planning, long-term advising, and 
more (Mission Capital, n.d.). 
Refugee Services of Texas initially proposed a new Interpretation Services 
enterprise that would both meet a “critical community need” and fulfill two strategic 
objectives: providing employment opportunities for refugee clients and building long-
term financial sustainability within the organization (RST, 2018a). While RST would be 
able to build on its existing infrastructure for contracting culturally-appropriate 
interpreters to support their own internal services, a new Interpretation Services program 
would be a completely new venture. RST presented a preliminary plan and requested 
specialized support from Social Venture Partners (SVPs) in pricing, customer acquisition, 
and scaling. RST entered impact academy with the hope of accomplishing two key 
deliverables: a feasibility study and a business plan.  
On February 25, 2019, Impact Academy held a half-day orientation workshop 
where Refugee Services of Texas had the opportunity to meet and begin working with 
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their SVP team. The team included SVPs with expertise in marketing, accounting, 
operations, and finance. During preliminary discussions, SVPs asked many probing 
questions about the feasibility of an interpretation service venture, how to make the most 
of their expertise over a four-month period, and RST’s existing earned income capacity. 
The focus of the meeting quickly shifted from planning next steps in developing an 
interpretation services venture to making a broader decision about the type of earned 
revenue project RST should pursue over the course of the Impact Academy partnership. 
The SVP team encouraged RST to consider pivoting the project’s focus to RST’s existing 
immigration legal services program, which was already generating revenue on a small 
scale. After further discussions with the SVP partners, RST’s board, and the 
organization’s leadership team, RST ultimately decided to focus on making the fee-based 
immigration legal services program more efficient and profitable. Over the next four 
months, with guidance from its SVP partners, RST engaged in preliminary business 
planning, created a financial model and estimated projected revenues, did market 
research on both pricing and staff structure, and analyzed administrative inefficiencies 
that limited the legal team’s caseload. RST still plans to consider a future interpretation 
services social enterprise and other possible earned income opportunities. It will be able 
to build on the lessons it learned from the legal services business planning process, as 
well as lessons from other local nonprofits, four of which are included here as 





The body of research on revenue diversification in nonprofit organizations has 
yielded inconclusive and at times contradictory results. Nonprofits vary dramatically in 
their structure, revenue sources, fundraising strategy, size, and history, making it nearly 
impossible to generalize research findings on nonprofit financial management. Research 
examining the impact of nonprofit revenue sources must attempt to control for a complex 
and extensive web of factors related to an organization’s structure and the context in 
which it operates. While the research has started to tease out the complex relationships 
between nonprofit revenue sources, financial health, program quality, sustainability, and 
growth, gaps in the research still remain.  
Much of the research on nonprofit earned revenue strategies and social enterprises 
has been conducted relatively recently and, in many cases, lacks conceptual clarity and 
agreed-upon definitions (Battilana & Lee, 2014). A search in EBSCOhost databases 
Academic Search Complete, Business Source Complete, and SocINDEX reveals 527 
scholarly journal articles with “social enterprise” in the title published between 1975 and 
2019, of which more than 85% were published during the last ten years. Nonprofits began 
to increasingly adopt earned revenue strategies during the 1980s in response to an 
economic downturn and declines in government funding for nonprofits (Battilana & Lee, 
2014; Doeringer, 2010). The term “social enterprise” began to gain popularity during that 
period, and between 1982 and 2002, the portion of income that nonprofits earned from 
commercial activity increased by approximately 20% (Doeringer, 2010). The nonprofit 
sector saw a similar surge in social entrepreneurship following the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis, but there continues to be limited empirical research on earned revenue. 
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REVENUE DIVERSIFICATION 
Many nonprofits seek to diversify their revenue streams to achieve benefits such 
as flexibility, autonomy, growth potential, and community connectedness (Hung & 
Hager, 2019). More diverse revenue streams may lead to increases in unrestricted funds, 
which are not tied to specific grant-funded services or contractual obligations. Diversified 
revenues may reduce overreliance on a specific funder or revenue stream, leading to 
greater financial stability. Nonprofits with several revenue streams can better weather 
reductions in a single funding source (Hung & Hager, 2019; Carroll & Stater, 2008). 
Revenue diversification may also bring nonprofits into contact with new partners and 
supporters and even increase visibility (Hung & Hager, 2019). Portfolio theory offers a 
theoretical framework through which these benefits can be viewed, providing “a lens 
through which to consider the optimal mix of revenue streams” (Hung & Hager, 2019, p. 
7). However, revenue diversification is not without drawbacks. These can include 
increased complexity and risk, administrative costs, and “mission drift,” or activities or 
decisions that run counter to the organization’s mission (Hung & Hager, 2019, p. 9). 
A recent meta-analysis of 40 studies finds a small, statistically significant 
association between revenue diversification and improved nonprofit financial health 
(Hung & Hager, 2019). However, the authors caution that inconsistent methods of 
measuring financial health limit the comparability of studies of revenue diversification 
(Hung & Hager, 2019). For example, some studies define financial health using measures 
of organizational capacity, while others define financial health using measures of 
organizational stability (Hung & Hager, 2019).  
Sacristán López de los Mozos et al. (2016) explore the effect of revenue 
diversification on fundraising. They find that increased diversification is associated with 
“higher operational inefficiency” but may have a negative impact on fundraising 
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efficiency (Sacristán López de los Mozos et al., 2016). Berrett and Holliday (2018) 
examined two revenue strategies, revenue concentration and revenue diversification, and 
found that revenue diversification was associated with increased organizational outputs. 
Revenue concentration, by contrast, was not associated with increased organizational 
outputs (Berrett & Holliday, 2018). 
Some authors question whether revenue diversification leads to improved 
financial health (Chikoto & Neely, 2014; von Schnurbein & Fritz, 2017). Chikoto and 
Neely (2014) draw on data from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) to 
examine nonprofit 990 tax filings from 1998-2003. They test whether revenue 
concentration leads to growth in financial capacity over a five-year period. The authors 
use multiple measures of financial growth, including percentage growth in total revenues, 
end-of-year total fund balances, and unrestricted end-of-year fund balance. Regression 
analysis using a large sample size (ranging from n=106,587 for unrestricted balance 
model and n=200,658 for total revenue growth model) found a statistically significant 
association between revenue concentration and five-year growth across each measure of 
revenue growth (Chikoto & Neely, 2014). However, when the authors looked at changes 
in revenue concentration over a five-year period, they found that increasing concentration 
was negatively associated with financial growth (Chikoto & Neely, 2014). A major 
limitation of Chikoto and Neely’s (2014) analysis is that it does not account for 
differences between concentrated revenue streams, for example between reliance on 
government grants and contracts, private donations, or client fees. Control variables 
include organization size, industry, and location, but do not include how long an 
organization has been operating. Subsequent research by Chikoto, Ling, and Neely 
(2016) reveals that the way revenue streams are counted and categorized affects analysis 
of the relationship between revenue concentration and financial health.   
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Von Schnurbein and Fritz (2017) build on Chikoto and Neely’s (2014) findings 
by using a seven-year revenue growth period and adding control variables for nonprofit 
size and age. Von Schnurbein and Fritz’ analysis used a sample of 191 Swiss nonprofit 
organizations (2017). Like Chikoto and Neely (2014), they found a negative association 
between revenue diversification and financial growth. In their model, higher program 
expenditures were associated with increased financial growth, and both younger and 
smaller organizations were associated with higher levels of financial growth (von 
Schnurbein & Fritz, 2017). 
EARNED REVENUE AS A REVENUE DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGY 
Many nonprofits have long relied on earned revenue to sustain their services; 
universities charge tuition, hospitals bill patients and their insurance companies, and 
many agencies use low-cost or sliding scale fee-for-service models (Battilana, 2018). 
More recently, the term “social enterprise” has been adopted to describe a range of 
organizations that pair business principals with a social mission. While the literature 
lacks consensus and conceptual clarity in defining social enterprise, authors often 
describe a “spectrum” ranging a traditional nonprofit to a traditional business (Teasdale, 
2012; Battilana & Lee, 2014; Mission Capital, 2017).  
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    Figure 1: Social Enterprise Spectrum (Mission Capital, 2017, p. 5). 
Figure 1 from Austin, TX nonprofit consulting group Mission Capital illustrates this 
spectrum with local and national examples. It locates social enterprises in a middle 
position overlapping both the nonprofit and private sectors, and it notes their blended 
purpose of achieving both social impact and financial return (Mission Capital, 2017). 
Stecker (2014) offers four distinct earned revenue categories nonprofit organizations can 
consider: the sale of branded merchandise; fee-for-service; founding a separate 
commercial for-profit enterprise; building a hybrid social enterprise; or a complete 
transition from non-profit to a for-profit business. 
Nonprofits adopt an earned revenue or social enterprise strategy for a variety of 
reasons. Nonprofits may want to increase unrestricted revenue, or revenue that is not 
contractually tied to a specific use or program. Earned revenue is seen as a steady source 
of income that may insulate nonprofits from reduced donations during an economic 
downturn or from increasing competition for philanthropic support (Smith et al., 2010). 
Research on the effectiveness of social enterprise or earned income models is still in its 
early stages, and much of the literature focuses on organizational theory. Methodological 
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approaches tend to focus on case studies built around qualitative interviews with 
nonprofit leaders. Empirical evidence is limited, but some studies have attempted to tease 
out the relationship between earned income, financial health, and nonprofit management. 
Ecer, Magro, and Sarpca (2017) compare financial efficiency in traditional 
nonprofits and social enterprises. They measure nonprofit financial efficiency using 
overhead ratios, administrative expense ratios, and fundraising ratios. They also generate 
“Share of Earned Income (SEI)” ratios, which measure revenue composition by 
comparing program service revenue to total revenue, and they include six revenue source 
variables (e.g. government grants). Control variables include size, age, subsector, and 
location type (urban or Metropolitan Statistical Area). Ecer et al. (2017) find that 
organizations that receive a higher proportion of revenues from program services (i.e. 
earned income) are generally more efficient in managing overhead and administrative 
expenses. However, traditional nonprofits with a lower SEI ratio appear to be more 
efficient in raising grants and donations (Ecer et al, 2017). 
Walske and Tyson (2015) explore an emerging pattern in which social enterprises 
are being founded at higher rates, but comparatively few are able to scale up their 
operations. The authors interview successful social entrepreneurs and identify factors that 
may contribute to successful scaling. They identify three major challenges social 
enterprises face as they attempt to scale: ensuring quality during rapid growth; access to 
both human and financial capital; and effective implementation of an earned revenue 
strategy (Walske & Tyson, 2015). Factors that contributed to social enterprises’ ability to 
scale successfully included: 
• Raising sufficient financial capital to support growth 
• Ability to establish a supply chain 
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• Having a strong media presence, which could lend “enhanced credibility” and 
attract funding (p. 274). 
Walske and Tyson found that a significant initial investor could play crucial role, serving 
as “a catalyst to increasing the organization’s credibility” and helping to attract follow-up 
investments (2015, p. 275). 
LEGAL STATUS 
Hybridity, or the blending of two different models or structures, is a key theme in 
both organizational theory literature and literature on business structure and legal 
classification. Social enterprises can have a tax-exempt nonprofit legal status, or they can 
operate as a for-profit business. However, some social entrepreneurs see these legal 
structures as insufficient in supporting the dual goals of social good and profit (Reiser, 
2012). Social enterprises that operate as for-profit businesses are limited in their ability to 
carry out a social mission by the imperative to maximize shareholder wealth (Reiser, 
2012). For-profit social enterprises also forgo the tax-exempt status available to 
nonprofits and the ability to raise tax-free donations (Doeringer, 2010). Nonprofits, 
meanwhile, are unable raise equity capital because they are barred from paying dividends 
to shareholders (Doeringer, 2010; Battilana et al., 2012).  
While nonprofits are allowed to engage in commercial activities under certain 
conditions, the laws governing earned revenue can be difficult to navigate, and their 
application has historically been “unclear, if not inconsistent” (Doeringer, 2010). 
Nonprofits are able to engage in commercial activities under two conditions: 
“insubstantial commercial activity is allowed so long as it does not stand in the way of 
the organization primarily operating for an exempt purpose, and substantial activity is 
allowed as long as it furthers the organization's exempt purpose” (Doerigner, 2010, p. 
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298). Commercial revenues that are not causally liked to the exempt social purpose of an 
organization are called “unrelated business income” (UBI) and may be subject to federal 
income taxes despite the organization’s overall tax-exempt status (Doerigner, 2010).  
In the U.S. and globally, new legal structures are emerging that attempt to better 
reflect social enterprises’ unique hybrid role. These include the low-profit limited liability 
company (L3C), the benefit corporation, and the flexible purpose corporation (Reiser, 
2012). Addae (2018) explores some of the factors that determine sector choice among 
social enterprises, which she primarily categorizes as: equity financing, organizational 
lineage, human capital, and funding environment. She found that nonprofit social 
enterprises tended to be “subsidiaries or spinoffs of existing nonprofit organizations.” 
The for-profit social enterprises Addae (2018) examined were shaped by the commercial 
sector experience of its leadership and access to equity financing. While legal structure is 
an important consideration many nonprofit leaders wrestle with when adopting a social 
enterprise model, the case studies and analysis in this paper will focus on social 
enterprises that retain their nonprofit status.  
THEORIZING DUAL PURPOSE ORGANIZATIONS 
While many social enterprises operate under a nonprofit legal status, they must 
still navigate the challenges of balancing a social mission with the goal of efficiently 
generating revenue. Scholars have studied the impact of these dual purposes on 
organizational structure and identity and the implications for nonprofit management 
(Battilana & Lee, 2014; Sanders, 2012, Teasdale, 2012; Smith et al., 2010; Young et al, 
2010). Sanders (2012) uses an “organizing tension” framework, arguing that nonprofit 
organizing is inherently contradictory and reflects a natural and continuous tension 
between financial imperatives, market forces, and social mission. According to Sanders 
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(2012), this tension is not limited to social enterprises, but “arises from the contradictory 
nature of the nonprofit sector itself” (p. 181).  
Smith et al. (2010) apply an organizational identity theoretical framework to 
social enterprises. Organizational identities help nonprofits differentiate themselves from 
other organizations, set norms and expectations, and communicate their purpose 
internally and externally (Smith et al., 2010). Social enterprises have multiple identities 
that can at times come into conflict, and nonprofit leaders navigate this conflict in 
different ways. Patterns emerged in Smith et al.’s interviews with 27 nonprofit social 
enterprise leaders (2010). Some nonprofits practice “compartmentalization,” keeping 
assets and stakeholder communication largely separate and unintegrated (Smith et al., 
2010). In cases Smith et al. label “deletion,” some nonprofits may determine that their 
income-generating venture is not raising sufficient revenue or is detracting too much 
from the social mission and choose to shut down their social enterprise (2010). A third 
approach, “integration,” occurs when nonprofits are able to blend both their business 
identity and charitable identity (Smith et al., 2010). The degree to which social 
enterprises are able to manage and integrate their commercial and social identities is a 
key theme throughout the literature on nonprofit social entrepreneurship. 
Fitzgerald and Shepard (2018) take a similar approach using the framework of 
institutional logics. Institutional logics refer to the “belief systems, values, and organizing 
frameworks” that govern an organization (Fitzgerald & Shepard, 2018). In a nonprofit 
organization, institutional logics are highly values-driven and include shared commitment 
to a cause, democratic governance, and ethical behavior. These contrast with for-profit 
institutional logics which are dominated by “a competitive market orientation and profit 
maximization” (p. 478). Social enterprises have to navigate these competing sets of 
organizational logics, which are each associated with a different set of norms, behaviors, 
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and values. The four approaches Fitzgerald and Shepard (2018) outline in Figure 2 mirror 
Smith et al.’s (2010) earlier theory of organizational identities: integration, aggregation, 
compartmentalization, and subordination. Integration, which other scholars label “the 
hybrid ideal” (Battilana, Lee, Walker, & Dorsey, 2012) occurs when organizations are 
able to blend social and commercial logics and achieve a shared commitment to both 
mission-based and profit-based goals (Fitzgerald & Shepard, 2018). 
 
 
  Figure 2: Fitzgerald & Shepherd, 2018, p. 484 
While some research shows that social enterprises’ hybrid identity can present 
significant challenges in communication with stakeholders, some nonprofits are able to 
effectively emphasize positive aspects of each identity while downplaying negative 
perceptions (Battilana, 2018; Smith et al., 2018). Battilana (2018) notes that the 
“ecosystem” in which nonprofits operate is still largely focused on binary categories of 
not-for-profit and for-profit, creating challenges ranging from stakeholder 
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communications to paralyzed decision-making. In some cases, social enterprise leaders 
risk compromising legitimacy with external partners because they “transgress established 
business and charity models (Battilana, 2018, p. 1285). They face concerns from 
commercial investors about the profitability of social objects, while philanthropic donors 
may be skeptical about profit-generating activities (Battilana, 2018). In many cases, 
however, nonprofits leaders are able to emphasize positive aspects of their social 
enterprise including increased self-sufficiency and innovation (Smith et al., 2010; 
Albrecht et al., 2018). Research on public perceptions of nonprofits shows that in some 
cases, even nonprofits that do not have a social enterprise are starting to adopt the 
language of social entrepreneurship to communicate their ability to “take risks, challenge 
norms, and introduce novel ideas and solutions to enhance mission and sustainability 
(Albrecht et al, 2018, p. 258).  
CATEGORIZING NONPROFIT EARNED REVENUE MODELS 
In addition to exploring the implications of social enterprises’ hybrid nature, 
scholars have also sought ways to categorize earned revenue models. A key distinction 
can be made between nonprofits that identify as a social enterprise from the moment they 
are founded and nonprofits that adopt a new earned revenue strategy later on. Smith et al. 
(2010) labels these categories “at conception,” where a social enterprise model was 
“integrated into the very fabric of the organization,” and “after conception,” where an 
earned revenue strategy was added on at a later point in an organization’s history. This is 
similar to Addea’s (2018) analysis of organizational lineage. According to Addea, (2018), 
nonprofit social enterprises tend to be adopted “after conception,” or later in the 
organization’s lineage, and tend to be “subsidiaries or spinoffs” of an existing service 
model (Smith et al., 2010; Addea, 2018). Smith et al.’s analysis suggests that adopting a 
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revenue generating strategy later in an organization’s lineage may be associated with 
more conflict between the business identity and the social mission of the organization 
(Smith et al., 2010). 
Fischer et al. (2011) explore the relationship between nonprofit revenue sources 
and the category of services provided. They identify a continuum of nonprofit services 
ranging from public in nature (e.g. public health education campaigns that benefit society 
as a whole) and private in nature (e.g. individual counseling where a single beneficiary 
can be identified). The authors compare nonprofits’ degree of “publicness” with their 
distribution of revenue sources (Fischer et al., 2011, p. 663). Predictably, nonprofits 
categorized as private have a greater share of revenues from earned income, and this 
pattern is particularly pronounced in the healthcare industry. Meanwhile, nonprofits 
categorized as public tend to rely more heavily on donations (Fischer et al., 2011).  
Social enterprises can also be categorized according to their level of “activity 
integration,” and by differentiating between customers and beneficiaries (Battilana & 
Lee, 2014, p. 413; Battilana et al., 2012). Activity integration refers to the degree to 
which commercial and social goals are achieved through either a common set of activities 
or through separate activities. 
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Figure 3: Battilana & Lee, 2014, p. 426 
As figure 3 illustrates, activity integration in social enterprises can be viewed across 
several dimensions and can affect how well social enterprises are able to navigate a 
variety of internal and external decisions and challenges. For example, when hiring 
employees, social enterprises have to choose whether to hire from the business or 
nonprofit sector, which has implications for compensation, employee satisfaction, and 
possible interpersonal conflict. Social enterprises also have to choose how to message 
with donors and other external stakeholders, develop performance measurement 
strategies, and shape the “pattern of values and norms” that constitutes its organizational 
culture (Battilana & Lee, 2014, p. 421). While increased activity integration is largely 
believed to help social enterprises navigate the tensions associated with balancing social 
and financial goals, the authors questions whether a truly integrated organizational 
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culture is possible if it “requires the reconciliation of competing norms and values” (p. 
421). Further research is needed on how nonprofit leaders navigate this tension and how 
much integration or separation of commercial and social activities is desirable (Battilana 
& Lee, 2014).  
Levine, Daniel, and Kim (2018) take a similar approach and categorize nonprofit 
earned revenue strategies according to mission alignment. Revenue generating activities 
are considered fully “embedded” if they directly contribute to the organization’s mission. 
Conversely, revenue generating activities are considered “external” if they are unrelated 
to the organization’s core mission and programs (Levine, Daniel, & Kim, 2018). Levine, 
Daniel, and Kim (2018) describe revenue generating activities that fall somewhere in 
between as “integrated revenues” (p. 953). The authors attempted to compare outcomes 
across these three categories in arts organizations using attendance to measure program 
success (Levine Daniel & Kim, 2018). While the authors noted the challenges of 
accounting for the overall funding structure of the organization, they found statistically 
significant positive association between mission-aligned, or “embedded,” revenue 
strategies and attendance levels, but no significant relationship between external revenue 
and attendance (Levine Daniel & Kim, 2018). 
Scholars also analyze social enterprises by distinguishing between customers and 
beneficiaries (Teasdale, 2012; Battilana, 2018; Battilana & Lee, 2014). Beneficiaries are 
the intended recipients of the social support offered by the nonprofit organization and 
may or may not constitute a distinct group from customers depending on the social 
enterprise. For example, many social enterprises focused on workforce development – 
Goodwill Industries is well-known example – hire their “beneficiaries” as employees to 
provide job experience and training. They must then balance the dual needs of 
beneficiaries with the interests of customers (Battilana & Lee, 2014). In this case, social 
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and commercial activities are still integrated or mission-embedded because commercial 
activities directly provide workforce development to employees, but customers and 
beneficiaries constitute two separate groups (Battilana & Lee, 2014). In many fee-for-
service models, customers and beneficiaries are a single group through which 
consumption and social value are linked. In these cases, “focusing on growth does not 
take away resources from beneficiaries” (Battilana et al., 2012). In other cases, social 
enterprises serve different groups of customers and beneficiaries, and their commercial 
and social activities are unintegrated. This last category faces the greatest challenges, 
because these social enterprises must balance competing needs of customers and 
beneficiaries and make trade-offs between its commercial and social activities (Battilana 
et al., 2012).    
MISSION ALIGNMENT 
A key thread throughout the literature on social entrepreneurship is the idea of 
mission alignment and corresponding concerns about mission “drift” (Battilana, 2018; 
Battilana & Lee, 2014). The degree to which commercial activities align with the social 
mission of an organization, as noted in the literature on organizational structure and 
identity, impacts many dimensions of nonprofit management from hiring, to service 
design, to pricing. Nonprofits adopting a new earned revenue model may face criticism or 
concerns that income generating activities will cause the organization to make decisions 
that compromise its social mission. Research links mission alignment with both the 
ability to raise philanthropic donations and with decision-making about fee structures. 
Smith, Cronley, and Barr (2012) found that nonprofits introducing a social enterprise 
model risk compromising their ability to raise individual donations. However, negative 
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effects on donor attitudes can be mitigated “when the social enterprise is perceived as 
mission consistent and competent” (Smith, Cronley, & Barr, 2012, p. 142).  
Young, Jung, and Aranson (2010) describe a “mission-market tension” in pricing 
decisions that nonprofit social enterprises must navigate. Nonprofits’ ultimate goals is 
fulfilment of their social mission, but achieving a financial sustainability can be a key 
component or prerequisite to this. This creates a tension, because “the acquisition of 
financial resources often requires choices that can limit mission effectiveness” (Young et 
al., 2010). Nonprofits face the challenge of being simultaneously judged on their ability 
to grow and be sustainable, as well as their ability to achieve their social mission. Young 
et al.’s case study-based research indicates that many nonprofits tend to approach pricing 
decisions in an “improvisational” manner rather than systematically” (2010, p. 167). 
Young et al. (2010) recommend that nonprofit organizations adopt simple tools to 
navigate this “mission-market tension,” and they offer a simple Mission/Market Scale for 
Pricing pictured in Figure 4 (p. 161).  
 
Figure 4: Young et a., 2010, p. 161. 
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Future research on social enterprises would benefit from continued development and 
testing of this kind of streamlined tool to help nonprofits navigate tensions between 





















Local Case Studies 
To better understand how nonprofits navigate the opportunities and challenges 
associated with implementing an earned revenue strategy, I conducted informational 
interviews with leaders of four nonprofits in Austin and Forth Worth. In addition to my 
participation in Mission Capital’s Impact Academy, I also attended the first two day-long 
sessions of Mission Capital’s Revenue Generator workshop. The Revenue Generator 
program helped three local nonprofits navigate the early stages of implementing a new 
earned revenue strategy. While I will not draw directly on the experience of Revenue 
Generator participants, the workshop deepened my understanding of how nonprofits 
navigate early market research, price analysis, business planning, and other decisions. 
These insights informed my analysis of the four case studies outlined below and Refugee 
Services of Texas’ earned revenue project. 
The case studies were selected using a combination of two broad criteria: 
recommendations and connections from UT faculty member and impact investor John 
Thornborrow and organizations that share a similar client population with Refugee 
Services of Texas. The two organizations recommended by Thornborrow, College 
Forward and EcoRise, represent two highly successful local social enterprise models 
whose earnings account for close to half of the organization’s total revenue. The other 
organizations I focused on share a specialization in refugee and immigrant populations in 
either all or a significant portion of their programing. Local Austin nonprofit 
Multicultural Refugee Coalition and Fort Worth nonprofit Catholic Charities of Fort 
Worth both have multiple social enterprises, including, at each organization, a program 
focused on language interpretation. These organizations provide a useful comparison 
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given the similarities in populations served and given that Refugee Services of Texas 
proposed an interpretation services venture in their initial application to Impact Academy. 
All four case studies will be analyzed across several of the key themes identified in the 
literature on social enterprises. These include, but are not limited to: 
• Mission alignment: the extent to which the revenue generating strategy aligns 
with the social mission of the organization. 
• Activity Integration: the extent to which the business activities and the social 
mission-based activities are overlapping or blended (Battilana & Lee, 2014). 
• Customers and Beneficiaries: whether social enterprise customers represent the 
same group as the target beneficiaries of the organization’s social mission. 
• Organizational Lineage and Timeline: whether the nonprofit was initially 
founded as a social enterprise (Smith et al.’s “at conception”), or whether a 
revenue generating model was adopted later on (Smith et al.’s “after 
conception”) (Smith et al, 2010; Addae, 2018). 
• Internal and External Messaging: how the earned revenue strategy is messaged 
internally to staff, board members, and clients, and how the earned revenue 
strategy is messaged to external stakeholders such as donors. 
CASE STUDY 1: ECORISE TEXAS 
EcoRise was founded in 2008 under the name Uplift Austin by its current 
president Gina LaMotte (no relation). Its mission is to inspire “a new generation of 
leaders to design a sustainable future for all” through school-based programs that 
empower “youth to tackle real world challenges in their schools and communities by 
teaching sustainability, design innovation, and social entrepreneurship” (EcoRise, n.d.). 
EcoRise sells curricula and teacher training to local and national school districts and 
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offers products targeted to elementary through high school teachers (EcoRise, 2018. It 
currently operates in six cities with a planned expansion to at least five more (EcoRise, 
2018). 
According to the organization’s 2016 990 tax return forms, program service 
revenue represented 30% of the total revenue (EcoRise, 2017). All program service 
revenues were categorized as “consulting fees” and EcoRise had a total operating budget 
of $881,835 according to their Statement of Functional Expenses (EcoRise, 2017). 
According to EcoRise president Gina LaMotte, EcoRise currently has an operating 
budget of approximately $1.2 million, approximately half of which is covered by earned 
income (G. LaMotte, personal communication, March 14, 2019). Of the four case studies 
presented here, EcoRise is the only example of an “at conception” social enterprise, or an 
organization that was envisioned from the start as a revenue-generating model (Smith et 
al., 2010). From the beginning, LaMotte envisioned EcoRise as a social enterprise that 
would primarily sell its products to school districts. EcoRise’s business activities and 
mission-driving activities are highly integrated; the more school districts purchase 
curricula and teacher training, the more students learn about sustainability. Despite this 
early adoption of a social enterprise model, the organization was not revenue-generating 
during its first few years until it secured initial contracts with school districts and 
individual schools. Since then, its earned income has grown from initially representing 
approximately 20% of EcoRise’s total budget to its current level of approximately half of 
the total operating budget (G. LaMotte, personal communication, Mary 14, 2019). 
EcoRise presents a particularly interesting case study for differentiating between 
customers and beneficiaries. It is difficult to identify one or two district groups of 
customers and beneficiaries; instead, several categories interact with the organization’s 
curriculum and training-based model. The customer who actually purchases the 
 28 
curriculum is typically a school district, or in some cases a third party such the Office of 
the State Superintendent of Education in Washington, D.C. LaMotte describes teachers as 
the “user,” which overlaps with both the customer and beneficiary categories. Teacher 
buy-in and satisfaction are essential to the success of the business, but teachers are not the 
decision-makers when making a sale. Teachers also benefit from the training and 
curricula that are purchased by their school district, but are not the target beneficiary 
according to the agency’s mission statement. The true beneficiaries are both the student 
and society more broadly, as indicated by EcoRise’s mission to empower youth and 
promote a “sustainable future for all” (EcoRise, n.d.). The added complexity of having 
multiple categories of customers and beneficiaries presents challenges at times, because 
successful curriculum sales rely on getting buy-in from top-to-bottom – simultaneously 
engaging teachers, while also identifying the department or school district official that 
can actually make the purchase (G. LaMotte, personal communication, March 14, 2019).  
Over the years, EcoRise maintained a steady pace of growth by continually 
analyzing and optimizing the price points for its projects and building a sales strategy (G. 
LaMotte, personal communication, March 14, 2019). This included adopting a 
customized Salesforce CRM software platform to track customers. EcoRise also 
continually experimented with offering different levels of customization and finding 
different ways to package their curriculum and training products. Strategies included 
offering free sample lessons; using a per-teacher fee structure for curricula and 
professional development; tailoring sales strategies depending on school district 
characteristics; and testing a train-the-trainer” model, among others (G. LaMotte, 
personal communication, March 14, 2019). The organization had to balance the benefits 
of tailoring and customization with the downsides of added complexity, such as the 
possibility of confusing potential customers. LaMotte increased EcoRise’s visibility in 
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the social impact community by participating in a Philanthropitch competition, which 
landed the organization a spot in Mission Capital’s 2016 Mission Accelerator Class. Like 
Refugee Services of Texas, the Mission Accelerator program paired EcoRise with social 
venture partners from the private sector to help the organization further scale its revenue 
generating activities. As EcoRise scaled its training and curricula sales, it explored 
pursuing a goal of having earned income cover 100% of its operating budget. LaMotte 
has since pivoted away from this goal in order to be able to take advantage of funding 
opportunities through corporate partnerships and grants, while still continuing to grow 
earned income (G. LaMotte, personal communication, March 14, 2019). 
CASE STUDY 2: COLLEGE FORWARD 
College Forward is an Austin-based nonprofit founded in 2003. College 
Forward’s mission is to “[coach] underserved, motivated students to achieve the benefits 
of higher education” (College Forward, n.d.). College Forward primarily has a direct 
service model, providing coaching, mentoring, and support to students who are both 
applying to and attending college (College Forward, n.d.). College Forward has multiple 
earned revenue strategies, including consulting services to help institutions build and 
implement their own student coaching programs. However, it’s most substantial income-
generating social enterprise is a software package called CoPilot.  
CoPilot was initially designed for internal use and was not intended to be a 
revenue-earning social enterprise (A. Buchan, personal communication, March 27, 2019). 
CoPilot was initially developed with the support of grant funding to fulfill a critical 
internal need for better student data. It operates on the Salesforce platform, and allows 
users to collect and track comprehensive information on students’ academic, financial, 
and social well-being (College Forward, 2016). This initial internal design process 
 30 
provided an “incubation stage” during which the organization did not have to worry 
about meeting market demand (A. Buchan, personal communication, March 27, 2019). 
College Forward used and tested the software for two years before making the decision to 
sell it to other education nonprofits, which CEO Austin Buchan sees as contributing to 
the quality of the software product (A. Buchan, personal communication, March 27, 
2019). Partner organizations began to approach College Forward and express interest in 
the software, prompting the organization to begin informal conversations about selling 
CoPilot. They pitched the idea at a board retreat and began the business planning process 
(A. Buchan, personal communication, March 27, 2019). In 2014, College Forward began 
selling CoPilot and scaled up rapidly. According to the organization’s 2014-2015 annual 
report, earned income revenue rose from $30,660 in 2014 to $296,456 in 2015. College 
forward reported $1,206,940 in Program Service Revenue on their 2016 IRS 990 form, 
about 20% of that year’s total revenue. Earned income is expected to represent close to 
40% of College Forward’s revenue this year (A. Buchan, personal communication, 
March 27, 2019).  
The process of bringing CoPilot to market and scaling the enterprise has brought 
its share of challenges. CoPilot is a clear example of an “after conception” social 
enterprise under Smith et al.’s (2010) framework. It was adopting later in the 
organization’s lineage as a “spinoff” that operates separately from CollegeForward’s 
longstanding core service model (Addae, 2018). Buchan discussed the cultural tension 
between an earned revenue strategy that operates like an edtech (education technology) 
startup and the organization’s longstanding direct service program. He emphasized the 
importance of communicating CoPilot’s role internally early on to help staff at every 
level understand how it both aligns with and supports the organization’s mission and 
vision. Initial challenges were often capacity related – finding the skillset and expertise 
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needed to create a business plan, develop a pricing and sales strategy, and determine the 
costs associated with running and scaling a new business. College Forward initially relied 
on a combination of internal staff, board member involvement, and consultants (A. 
Buchan, personal communication, March 27, 2019).  
CoPilot is mission-aligned in that it helps similar nonprofits make their services 
more data-driven, but CoPilot sales remain separate from College Forward’s central 
coaching-based service model. CoPilot customers are other education organizations 
providing student support; its beneficiaries are ultimately the students who receive better 
services, as well as the staff members whose work is improved by more streamlined and 
robust data management. Buchan believes that the success of the enterprise has 
contributed positively to the organization’s relationships with donors and philanthropic 
funders, though he noted that in some cases he has had to confront the narrative that 
College Forward no longer needs robust philanthropic support. Looking to the future, 
Buchan hopes to find ways to continue to grow CoPilot in ways that are aligned with the 
organization’s mission and vision, such as piloting a student-facing version of the app (A. 
Buchan, personal communication, March 27, 2019). 
CASE STUDY 3: CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF FORTH WORTH 
Catholic Charities of Fort Worth (CCFW) currently has four earned revenue 
strategies that operate out of a large standalone social enterprise department with a 
budget of $8 million and a staff of 75 employees (M. Dibra, personal communication, 
April 4, 2019). CCFW’s first and largest earned revenue strategy is its Translation and 
Interpretation Network (TIN). Subsequent earned revenue programs include a 
transportation program, fee-based immigration legal services, and a dental clinic for low- 
and moderate-income families (CCFW, n.d.). The interpretation services program began 
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in 1991 with a one-time state government grant intended to help CCFW create a self-
sustaining program based on growing interpretation needs in the community. It continued 
as a self-sustaining program until 2005, when a new CEO recognized its income 
generating potential and decided bring it to scale as a social enterprise that could help 
support CCFW’s broader mission. Catholic Charities invested in a year-long training on 
developing a successful social enterprise through a Washington, D.C.-based consulting 
group. According to TIN Senior Director Mita Dibri, this training played a pivotal role in 
helping CCFW create a business plan and shift TIN from a self-sustaining program to a 
profitable social enterprise (M. Dibra, personal communication, April 4, 2019).  
Catholic Charities of Fort Worth’s mission is to lift families out of poverty, and 
Translation and Interpretation Network (TIN) remains separate from the organization’s 
primary mission-fulfilling holistic case management services. It is, however, mission-
aligned, as refugees and immigrants are among the organization’s target populations and 
TIN both provides employment opportunities and increases language access. 
Approximately 30% of TIN employees are former Catholic Charities refugee clients (S. 
Avila, personal communication, April 4, 2019). TIN also advocates for language access 
in the Fort Worth community and works to promote high standards for quality assurance 
and training (M. Dibri, personal communication, April 4, 2019). Translation and 
Interpretation Network’s customers are the agencies and businesses that use its 
interpreters and translators. Its beneficiaries include the clients who are able to access 
services in their primarily language; immigrant and refugees whose access to 
employment is increased by TIN; and the broader community impacted by TIN’s 
advocacy and training.  
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CASE STUDY 4: MULTICULTURAL REFUGEE COALITION 
Like EcoRise, Multicultural Refugee Coalition’s has adopted a fully social 
enterprise-based model. It is a workforce development program whose mission is “to 
create livelihood opportunities for refugees” (MRC, N.d.). However, unlike EcoRise, it 
was not envisioned as a social enterprise model from the start. Instead, it first arose in 
response to a community need for increased support for refugees resettling in the Austin 
area (J. Mann, personal communication, April 17, 2019). It was founded in 2009 by two 
Liberian refugees and two staff members at existing local nonprofits, and it began by 
offering educational support programs such as computer literacy, career development, 
sewing groups, and a gardening program (Winslow, 2015). In this earlier iteration, the 
organization primarily used a walk-in center model whose impact was hard to measure; 
services tended to be informal responses to the issues presented by walk-in clients (J. 
Mann, personal communication, April 17, 2019).  
About three years ago, a board visioning session identified employment as a key 
area of focus in order to maximize MRC’s impact on the local refugee community (J. 
Mann, personal communication, April 17, 2019). This closely coincided with another 
pivotal moment for the organization – being gifted the Open Arms manufacturing studio 
in 2014. In the words of MRC founder and CEO Meg Erskine, Open Arms was donated 
to the organization “to expand our impact within the refugee community and provide 
revenue model for our nonprofit” (as quoted in Harvey, 2018). According to Erskine, it 
allowed the organization to “refine our mission to creating livelihood opportunities for 
refugees in textile manufacturing and language services” (as quoted in Harvey, 2018). 
Open Arms manufactures a variety of textile products ranging from home goods to bags 
to apparel in partnership with retailers and designers who want to adopt social conscious 
production practices. The studio provides fair-wage employment to refugees in the Austin 
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area and offers opportunities for on-the-job training, apprenticeship, and ESL classes 
(Harvey, 2018). This shift to a revenue-generating workforce development model set the 
groundwork for the organization’s subsequent social enterprises, Shared Voices language 
services and New Leaf Agriculture which both launched in 2017.  
New Leaf Agriculture represents an expansion of previous community gardening 
initiatives and now includes a commercial farm in Elgin, TX. New Leaf employs 
refugees as farmers and provides free technical education. New Leaf uses both a 
Community Supported Agriculture (CSA) model to sell produce, as well as “Farm-to-
Maker” partnerships with local producers such as Barton Springs Mill (MRC, n.d.). 
Shared Voices, meanwhile, primarily generates revenue through the interpreter trainings 
it provides, which include a 40-hour Community Interpreter course and specialized 
follow-up workshops on medical and mental health interpreting. Course fees for refugee 
participants are typically underwritten by local institutions that support refugees such as 
churches and other nonprofits. MRC does not employ refugees directly, but they advocate 
in the community for the importance of professional interpretation and for a fair wage of 
at least $30 per hour (J. Mann, personal communication, April 17, 2019; MRC, n.d.). The 
organization also has a contract with the City of Austin and provides on-site training for 
bilingual City staff (MRC, n.d.).  
According to Chief Operating Officer Jessica Mann, Multicultural Refugee 
Coalition (MRC) is working toward a goal of having business revenue cover 80% of the 
organization’s funding. In 2017, earned income represented 43% of MRC’s revenues 
(MRC, 2017). In 2018, it grew to 53%, and Mann estimates that approximately 55-60% 
of revenues currently come from earned income (J. Mann, personal communication, April 
17, 2019). MRC is unique in that it is not an “at conception” social enterprise under 
Smith et al.’s (2010) framework, but the organization made a full pivot from a more 
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traditional direct service model to a social enterprise-based model. In a Forbes interview, 
CEO Meg Erskine shared a key takeaway from this transition: the need to “embrace a 
concise, self-contained mission” (as quoted in Harvey, 2018). The organization’s 
commercial activities – textile and agricultural production – are mission-integrated in that 
they directly provide employment and training to the refugee population MRC serves 
(Battilana & Lee, 2014). The customers purchasing these goods are different from the 
organization’s beneficiaries, however, and the organization has to navigate the tension 
between competitive market pricing and the mission-fulfilling goals of providing a fair 
living wage and offering free training. Even with earned income representing a large 
proportion of MRC’s total revenues, philanthropic funding can play a key role as a bridge 
to achieving the level of wages and benefits that align with the organization’s social 













Several themes emerge in the four case studies presented here. It is clear that, 
consistent with the literature, mission-alignment and the extent to which business and 
social identities and activities are integrated plays a key role in how social enterprises 
develop and operate. Most of the organizations adopted an earned revenue model under a 
highly unique set up of circumstance, many of which would be difficult to predict and 
plan for. This has implications for both future research on nonprofit earned revenue and 
for attempts to establish any kind of best practices for nonprofits that hope to develop a 
future earned revenue strategy. It also reflects key aspects of each organizations’ 
leadership: flexibility and a level of comfort with risk-taking that allows the organization 
to recognize opportunities and pivot in response to shifting circumstances. Lastly, the 
adoption of an earned revenue or social enterprise model has a profound impact on 
organizational culture – an impact which is navigated in different ways through internal 
and external messaging to employees, donors, and other stakeholders.  
MISSION ALIGNMENT 
In two of the case studies presented here, the commercial activities of a social 
enterprise were closely integrated with the organization’s social mission. For both 
EcoRise and Multicultural Refugee Coalition, the organization’s income-generating 
programs directly fulfill the agency’s respective mission. In the case of EcoRise, 
expanded sales of school curricula directly result in more students being trained in 
environmental literacy. Multicultural Refugee Coalition’s social enterprises provide 
employment and job training for the refugees it serves. This near-complete activity 
integration allows both organizations to fully operate under a social enterprise model and 
achieve a high proportion of earned income. In the case of College Forward and Catholic 
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Charities of Fort Worth, the organizations’ social enterprises added onto an existing 
direct service model that does not blend or overlap with income-generating activities. 
Despite this separation, in both cases the earned revenue strategy aligns with the 
organization’s mission. Both fulfill a model used by Mission Capital in their revenue 
workshops (pictured in Figure 5): ensuring that an earned revenue venture lies “at the 
intersection of a uniquely valuable product or expertise, clear mission alignment, and a 
client or customer who has the ability to pay” (Denison-Bickett, 2018). 
 
Figure 5: Earned Revenue Venn Diagram, Denison-Bickett, 2018 
In the case of Catholic Charities of Fort Worth (CCFW), the organization’s first earned 
revenue strategy emerged from a combination of a clear community need for 
interpretation services and a unique expertise from stemming from its work with diverse 
immigration and refugee populations. While interpretation services do not directly 
address CCFW’s mission to end poverty, they improve language access for the diverse 
Forth Worth community the organization serves. CollegeForward first developed and 
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tested its CoPilot software package to improve its own service model, then adopted an 
earned revenue strategy in response to a clear demand among other nonprofits doing 
similar work. CoPilot promotes data-driven services in college access programs both 
within and outside the organization. In communicating with various stakeholders, College 
Forward and CCFW both strongly emphasize the ways in which in their social enterprises 
align with their respective missions and values – an approach that is particularly 
important given that they do not share the same overlap in business and mission-based 
activities compared with EcoRise and MRC. The research shows that mission-alignment 
is key to maintaining philanthropic support, and all four organizations continue to rely 
heavily and donations and grants (Smith, Cronley, & Barr, 2012).  
ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT AND LEADERSHIP 
Several of the organizations highlighted in the case studies adopted an earned 
revenue model under a unique set up of circumstance that would be difficult to predict 
and plan for. Translating these circumstances into a successful earned revenue strategy 
requires organizational leadership that is willing to embrace change, recognize 
opportunities, and take risks. Catholic Charities of Fort Worth’s interpretation services 
program operated for over a decade before a new CEO to recognized its potential and 
invested in a year-long training program to grow it from a self-sustaining program to an 
income-generating social enterprise department. Multicultural Refugee Coalition made 
perhaps the most dramatic shift, facilitated in part by the donation of the Open Arms 
textile factory. The organization’s CEO Meg Erskine discussed her flexible leadership 
approach: “I think it’s really important to check in regularly to see if you are still on the 
right track or if you need to pivot to meet the needs. We did this as we evolved our 
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mission provide livelihood opportunities beyond the initial community support and feel 
that we have really hit our sweet spot” (as quoted in Harvey, 2018).  
Even in the case of EcoRise, which has remained consistent in both its mission 
and its social enterprise model from the start, president and founder Gina LaMotte 
demonstrates a similar flexibility. When a large grant opportunity presented itself, 
LaMotte was willing to pivot away from her goal of having the organization be 
completely supported by earned income and instead pursue growth and sustainability 
through a blend of earned income and philanthropy. In Mission Capital’s Revenue 
Generator workshop, trainers pointed out the difference between traditional nonprofit 
operating models and earned income strategies. Nonprofits are used to the linear 
approach that characterizes many social service logic models, with specific inputs leading 
to a set of outcomes. Earned revenue, by contrast, is a more iterative and less linear 
process – a shift in thinking that may not be right for every nonprofit (Denison-Bickett & 
Kirkland, 2019). While it is critical that nonprofit leaders and scholars understand this 
flexible, iterative approach, it also creates substantial challenges to future research on 
nonprofit social enterprises. These nuances are difficult to capture in a standardized set of 
metrics, and empirical methods will likely never fully capture the kind of decision-
making and external circumstances that contribute to a successful earned revenue model. 
It is no surprise that current research focuses so heavily on case studies. While more 
empirical research is needed, a full understanding of nonprofit earned revenue will 
require a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. 
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
The adoption of an earned revenue or social enterprise model also has a profound 
impact on organizational culture. This is reflected in different ways through internal and 
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external messaging to employees, donors, and other stakeholders. College Forward CEO 
Austin Buchan discussed the cultural tension that arose when they adopted a social 
enterprise model that resembles an education technology startup; both the mindset and 
expertise needed to launch successful software sales differ dramatically from the 
institutional logics of a longstanding coaching and mentoring direct service program 
(Fitzgerald & Shelpard, 2018; A. Buchan, personal communication, March 27, 2019). 
Buchan considered whether to operate CoPilot as a for-profit subsidiary, but ultimately 
decided that keeping them integrated would better support a cohesive organizational 
culture. He promotes this by actively emphasizing in both internal and external 
communication the ways in which CoPilot aligns with CollegeForward’s overall mission. 
In addition to emphasizing the ways in which CoPilot aligns with College Forward’s 
higher education-promoting mission, Buchan noted that he simultaneously began to 
integrate innovation and entrepreneurship into the organization’s existing mission and 
values (A. Buchan, Personal Communication, March 27, 2019). This strategy – aligning 
the CoPilot enterprise with the organization’s social mission, while also incorporating 
social entrepreneurship into the overall values governing the organization – represents a 
proactive approach to reconciling the organization’s dual identities (Smith et al., 2010). 
This helps mitigate any tensions that might arise between the organization’s direct service 
staff and CoPilot team, and it helps attract new employees who are committed to both the 
organization’s direct service model and its revenue generating activities. 
Catholic Charities of Fort Worth (CCFW) and Multicultural Refugee Coalition 
(MRC), the other two “after conception” nonprofit social enterprise models, use a 
similarly proactive approach to aligning their social and business identities in external 
communications (Smith et al., 2010). CCFW communicated its commitment to social 
entrepreneurship with the creation of a standalone social enterprise department, which is 
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featured prominently on the organization’s website. CCFW’s website emphasizes both 
the mission alignment and financial contribution of its four earned income initiatives: 
“Each business has a purpose; to use its products, services and employment 
opportunities to help those in need. Social enterprises provide CCFW with a 
sustainable model that empowers us to take action when we identify an unmet 
need in our community.” 
MRC, meanwhile, opted to fully integrate social entrepreneurship into the employment-















Refugee Services of Texas Case Study 
INITIAL PROJECT DEVELOPMENT 
In the fall of 2018, Refugee Services of Texas (RST) identified Mission Capital’s 
Impact Academy program as an opportunity to implement a key initiative identified in 
their 2015-2020 strategic plan – diversifying revenues through social entrepreneurship. 
Impact Academy is a new program that helps nonprofits build their earned revenue 
capacity with technical assistance and guidance from a team of private sector Social 
Venture Partners (SVPs). Refugees Services of Texas specifically sought earned revenue 
opportunities that would align with their four strategic goals: Serve, Sustain, Strengthen, 
and Engage: 
 
Figure 6: Strategic Goals. RST, 2018b. 
For RST, a successful earned revenue strategy should adhere to the agency’s commitment 
to provide excellent services; make the organization more financially sustainable; build 
the organization’s capacity to expand and develop programs; and further engage 
community members, clients, and other stakeholders in the organization’s work.  
Refugee Services of Texas identified various potential revenue-generating 
strategies: an expansion of current fee-for-service Immigration Legal Services; an 
interpretation services venture that would provide employment opportunities to former 
refugee clients; and licensing of two tools the organization hoped to develop: a Client 
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Stability Scale to measure refugee services outcomes and a Client Services Portal. These 
options range from a program that is already operational to ventures that are in earlier 
stages of ideation and development, which would require a significant investment of time 
and resources. Refugee Services of Texas selected an interpretation service venture, 
which falls in the middle of this range, as the focus of its proposal to Mission Capital’s 
Impact Academy, and RST was one of three participating organizations selected through 
a competitive process. The interpretation services enterprise would build on RST’s robust 
internal infrastructure for contracting interpreters to use in meetings with refugee and 
immigrant clients; RST spends close to $75,000 per year in transition services across its 
network and its network of clients represent 30 distinct languages (RST, 2018a). The 
organization is particularly well placed to offer cross-cultural interpretations services in 
difficult-to-find languages because of this network and RST’s experience providing 
culturally appropriate services.  
DECISION TO PIVOT 
Impact Academy offered Refugee Services of Texas (RST) an opportunity to 
focus on earned revenue with the support of a team of private sector Social Venture 
Partners (SVP). The SVP partners worked closely with an internal project team 
comprised of RST’s CEO, Senior Programs Director, Development and Communications 
Coordinator, and two graduate interns. The organization initially approached the project 
with two overarching goals. First, RST saw interpretation services as a highly mission-
aligned program to create employment opportunities for immigrant and refugee clients 
and to meet a community need for increased language access. Second, RST approached 
Impact Academy with the strategic goal of increasing unrestricted revenue for the 
agency, reducing reliance on government funding, and building long-term financial 
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sustainability. In initial meetings with SVP partners, RST’s CEO Russell Smith quickly 
realized that four months of SVP support would not take the project as far as the 
organization had initially hoped. They might achieve a feasibility analysis and market 
research, but would be unlikely to progress to a fully developed business plan and 
revenue projections. Social venture partners also raised critical questions about the 
resources and planning that would be required to launch a brand-new interpretation 
program.  
The SVPs, whose combine expertise included marketing, accounting, operations, 
and finance, prompted RST to carefully consider how the team should focus its energies 
over the four-month Impact Academy program. Smith and the RST team asked 
themselves: should RST build a new program that would benefit its mission, and possibly 
contribute earned income in the long run; or, should the focus of the project truly be on 
earned revenue? Through these conversations, the Impact Academy team identified 
RST’s existing fee-for-service immigration program as a potential “low-hanging fruit” 
that would likely offer a faster and more feasible path to increasing the organization’s 
earned revenue. Smith took a week to discuss the two options internally with his senior 
leadership team, development staff, and board, and ultimately decided that the Impact 
Academy program would be a better fit with an expansion of the immigration legal 
services program. Refugee Services of Texas was initially drawn to the idea of an 
interpretation services venture because of its high degree of mission alignment, but had to 
recognize the realities and most urgent needs of the organization, namely mitigating the 
RST’s reliance on federal funding in a time of declining refugee resettlement numbers. 
This ability to make a quick pivot – even if it meant letting go of the initial proposal to 
Mission Capital – is reflective of the leadership qualities discussed in earlier case study 
analysis. 
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IMPACT ACADEMY BUSINESS PLANNING PROCESS 
Once Refugee Services of Texas (RST) made the decision to focus its work with 
Impact Academy on immigration legal services, the first step was a use a Business Model 
Canvas (BMC) framework to inform the goals and strategies guiding the project. Mission 
Capital adapted the Business Model Canvas template from Ash Maurya’s Running Lean, 
and the organization uses the BMC throughout their work on nonprofit earned revenue 
strategies. According to the Business Model Canvas, RST’s immigration legal services 
will have the dual goal of (1) providing affordable immigration legal services to refugees, 
asylees, and immigrants in Texas and (2) diversifying RST revenue streams. RST 
identified its competitive advantage as its “deep trust within the community and among 
clients” and its “comprehensive set of services to the refugee/immigrant community,” 
allowing many clients to receive a broader range of services outside of their immigration 
legal case. The Business Model Canvas also identified four key activities to be 
accomplished over the course of the project: 
• Identifying an efficient staffing structure, with a particular focus on the ratio of 
attorneys to legal assistants; 
• recruiting talented, mission-focused legal staff; 
• determining pricing; and 
• outreach and scaling. 
These activities were refined over time to encompass four overarching project 
deliverables: 
• Baseline financial model and future revenue projections; 
• strategies to increase program efficiency; 
• market research on pricing and staff structure; and 
• creating infrastructure to make program more data-driven going forward. 
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IMMIGRATION LEGAL SERVICES FINANCIAL MODEL 
Refugee Services of Texas (RST) met with their team of Social Venture Partners 
(SVPs) every few weeks throughout March, April, and May. The SVPs first asked RST 
to research how other nonprofits structure their legal team and try to determine the most 
efficient ratio of staff members to legal assistants. They also asked RST build a financial 
model based on historical program data that could serve as a baseline for projecting 
changes in revenue from price increases or staffing changes. This proved to be one of the 
most challenging aspects of the project and revealed two critical areas of focus for the 
second half the project: a need for better data and a need to increase administrative 
efficiency. The immigration program had a legal staff of three at the start of the project, 
all of whom had started within the past year. The Dallas office was staffed with one 
attorney and one legal assistant and the Austin office had one legal assistant and was in 
the process of hiring a new attorney. The first financial model used aggregated legal 
caseloads across each site from FY 2016-FY 2018 to determine a historical weekly 
average for each case type. As illustrated in Table 3, these were paired with RST’s 
current fee schedule and used to estimate an annual profit and loss (P&L) statement. This 
model included average revenues from government contracts to help clients apply for 
citizenship (naturalization) and to help refugees and asylees apply for a green card 








P&L Based on Historical Average Caseload 
Revenues  Overall Austin 
 Fees for Service (historical average - 1 lawyer /1 legal assistant) $101,949 $146,045 
 Refugee Social Services (RSS)   
 
 
Adjustments of Status (grant-funded) -ave 100 x $300  $30,000 $30,000 
 
 
Naturalizations (grant-funded) -ave 30 x $200  $6,000 $6,000 
     
 Total Revenues $137,949 $182,045 
     
     
Expenses    
 Salary - Lawyer $52,000 $52,000 
 Salary - Legal Assistant $32,000 $32,000 
 Payroll Taxes & Benefits (29%) $24,360 $24,360 
     
 Total Expenses $108,360 $108,360 
     
Revenues Over (Under) Expenses $29,589  $73,685  
Table 3: P&L Model 1 
In reviewing the initial P&L model, the RST team struggled to reconcile the 
significant difference between the Austin office’s average revenue and the overall 
revenue that included the Dallas/Fort Worth office. While the model assumed that the 
weekly caseload reflected a typical RST single-office legal team of one attorney and one 
legal assistant, the program had experienced substantial turnover over the past few years. 
The team spoke with legal staff at both offices to try to better calculate staff-specific 
caseloads, and these conversations quickly revealed areas for improvement in the legal 
team’s data management systems. The program uses a case management software that 
has the benefits of being free and user-friendly, but the software cannot generate Excel 
reports with sortable data. Staff entered data in up to three different Excel spreadsheets, 
but the documents were difficult to compare and were structured differently across the 
two office locations. Through this initial stage of financial modeling, the Impact 
Academy team identified data management systems as a key area of improvement to 
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better capture caseload data, case timelines, and program revenues. These conversations 
with legal staff also revealed a second key area of focus for the project: reducing 
administrative inefficiencies. Staff spent a substantial amount of time on administrative 
tasks including trips to the bank and post office and data entry across multiple record-
keeping systems.  
While capturing the caseload of an individual attorney was not possible based on 
RST’s current record-keeping system, the next financial model (Table 4) attempted to 
isolate the respective caseloads of (1) a single attorney and a half-time legal assistant 
team; and (2) a single legal assistant. This was calculated based on start dates of current 
legal staff. The model also treated grant-funded cases as fee-based cases to estimate the 
revenues the program would generate if it was operating under a fully fee-for-service 
model. 
 
P&L: Fee for Service Only (operating at current capacity with no grant-based cases) 
Revenues  Dallas Austin Overall 
 Fees for Service $81,160 $40,464 $121,624 
 (historical average - 1 FTE lawyer / 0.5 FTE legal assistant)  
 Total Revenues $81,160 $40,464 $121,624 
     
     
Expenses     
 Salary - Lawyer $52,000  52,000 
 Salary - Legal Assistant * 1/2 $16,000 $32,000 $48,000 
 Payroll Taxes & Benefits (29%) $19,720 $9,280 $29,000 
     
 Total Expenses $87,720 $41,280 $129,000 
     
Revenues Over (Under) Expenses ($6,560) ($816) ($7,376) 
Table 4: P&L Model 2 
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Next, a third financial model was created with several assumptions that addressed factors 
believed to contribute to the losses in Table 4. First, the third model assumed a three-
person legal team of one attorney and two legal assistants all based at a single RST 
office, which would reduce the time spent providing remote supervision. Second, 
government grant funding was built back into the model based on the Dallas office’s FY 
2019 contract. Third, the model assumes that mail, banking, and recording keeping 
processes are successfully streamlined and that the third legal assistant focuses on 
administrative support and takes a smaller caseload. This administrative streamlining is 
assumed to result in the following caseload increases: 
• The attorney is able to take on the entire caseload represented in the previous 
model (1 FTE attorney and 0.5 FTE legal assistant), plus additional 
consultations. 
• The second legal assistant is fully trained and has reduced administrative tasks, 
allowing a 20% increase in the Austin legal assistant’s caseload based on the 
second model. 
This three-person staff structure reflects recommendations made by staff at other legal 
services nonprofits, although the data collected on staff structure ranged substantially and 









P&L: Single Office with Administrative Streamlining 
Revenues     
 Fees for Service $98,779  
 Grant-based  $70,950  
 Total Revenues $169,729  
     
     
Expenses     
 Salary - Lawyer $52,000  
 Salary - Legal Assistant $32,000  
 Salary - Legal Assistant $32,000  
 
Payroll Taxes & Benefits 
(29%) $33,640  
     
 Total Expenses $149,640  
     
Revenues Over (Under) Expenses $20,089   
     
Table 5: P&L Model 3 
This model, pictured in Table 5, provides a promising and achievable starting point. It 
illustrates the importance of reducing administrative burdens, as well as the importance 
of continuing to support program growth through grant funding.  
A fourth and final financial model was created when an SVP partner was able to 
obtain a fee structure from the director of another local nonprofit with a very similar low-
bono immigration legal services program. Analysis of RST’s fee structure and the partner 
organization’s fee structure across 18 comparable case categories showed that, on 
average, RST’s prices would need to increase by 52% to reach a typical non-profit 
market rate. This final model took the third iteration of the P&L pictured in Table 5 and 
increased RST’s fees to 90% nonprofit market rate across the 18 comparable categories: 
 
 51 
P&L Single Office with Administrative Streamlining + 
90% Nonprofit Market Rate 
Revenues    
 Fees for Service $182,074 
 Grant-based  $70,950 
 Total Revenues $253,024 
    
    
Expenses    
 Salary - Lawyer $52,000 
 Salary - Legal Assistant $32,000 
 Salary - Legal Assistant $32,000 
 
Payroll Taxes & Benefits 
(29%) $33,640 
    
 Total Expenses $149,640 
    
Revenues Over (Under) Expenses $103,384  
Table 6: Final P&L Model 
Refugee Services of Texas presented this final financial model at Impact 
Academy’s closing celebration in June 2019, along with the team’s proposal to achieve 
the planned revenue increase and continued growth. Refugee Services of Texas and two 
of its Social Venture Partners decided to continue their partnership and presented three 
continuing projects that will grow the immigration legal services program. First, it is 
clear that RST needs to update its fee schedule. The pricing structure used by RST’s 
immigration legal services program had not been adjusted in over two years and was 
already at a low level compared with other local nonprofits. RST set a new goal of 
pricing its services at approximately 90% of the local nonprofit market rate, which will 
be implemented in the Fall of 2019 after the legal team reviews and adjusts the current 
fee schedule. This will allow the program to continue to attract clients and serve low-
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income families with low fees, while also raising legal services net revenues by nearly 
250% (compared with overall historical average revenues in Table 3). RST will continue 
to offer free legal services under current and prospective grant funding, allowing the 
agency to continue to work with displaced populations that may not be able to afford 
even the lowest fees. Free legal services will continue to be offered to refugees and 
asylees who are eligible for a green card or citizenship status, and RST hopes to expand 
free immigration legal services to survivors of human trafficking and other serious crimes 
under a new grant.  
Refugee Services of Texas and the social venture partners identified a second 
ongoing project to achieve the revenues outlined in Table 6: streamlining administrative 
procedures. Conversations with legal staff identified several areas where cumbersome 
administrative processes limit their legal caseload capacity. This will be the primary 
focus of the two social venture partners (SVPs) who are continuing their partnership with 
RST. With SVP support, RST will set up both a mobile bank deposit system and in-office 
mail processing. The SVPs are also helping RST identify and test new legal case 
management software systems to facilitate a more streamlined data entry process and 
produce better reporting. Like the organizations analyzed in the four case studies, RST 
plans to subsidize some of the up-front costs of growing the legal services program with 
philanthropic funding. For example, RST included the costs associated with 
implementing a new case management software system in a recent grant proposal.  
Lastly, the Impact Academy team developed a third project to collect better data 
on the time and effort associated with each case type. One of the greatest challenges RST 
wrestled with in developing the financial model was coming up with an accurate estimate 
for a monthly caseload. Currently, RST lacks consistent information about the timeline 
associated with each case type, which it needs to inform the fee schedule and determine 
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staffing needs. The Impact Academy team will continue to vet new case management 
software programs with the goal of selecting software that generates customizable, 
sortable Excel reports that capture: 
• Client data 
• RST staff and location information 
• Funding source (grant / fee-for-service) 
• Client meetings 
• Case outcome and timeline 
Once the legal team has fully migrated to the new software, RST will be able to 
easily track the time, effort, and fees associated with each case on an ongoing basis and 
make data-informed program adjustments. However, the Impact Academy team also 
wanted to get a quick snapshot of RST’s current caseload and capacity, as well as a more 
accurate estimate of time spent on administrative activities such as mail processing, data 
entry, and scheduling. With support from the SVPs, RST designed a rapid two-month 
time and effort study using the time tracking software platform Clockify. Legal staff will 
track all activities for the months of June and July 2019, and they will tag each entry 
using de-identified numbers for individual clients. This will give RST a baseline estimate 
of the timeline associated with common legal cases, which will help ensure that the fee 
schedule reflects the time and effort associated with each case. RST will analyze and 
review the Clockify data at the end of July 2019. 
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Recommendations for Refugee Services of Texas and Future Research 
REFUGEE SERVICES OF TEXAS 
While Refugee Services of Texas (RST) made significant progress toward 
growing its Immigration Legal Services earned revenue model, it still hopes to further 
scale up the program and expand it to three other sites. RST also hopes to continue to 
explore other social enterprise strategies, such as the interpretation services venture it 
initially proposed in its Impact Academy application. In its future work on social 
entrepreneurship, RST will be able to build on its work with Impact Academy over the 
past four months. The literature and four comparison case studies presented in this report 
also offers lessons RST can draw on as it continues to expand Immigration Legal 
Services and explore future earned income models. The recommendations here are 
specifically targeted to Refugee Services of Texas, as the research in this report and the 
literature on social enterprises more broadly is not sufficiently comprehensive to establish 
broad best practices.  
Recommendations 
1. Continue to focus on data collection. The literature, the four comparison case 
studies, and Mission Capital’s training sessions all clearly demonstrated that 
developing an earned revenue strategy is an iterative process that requires 
flexibility, risk-taking, and a willingness to shift directions when needed. 
However, it was the in-depth practical application of this process with Refugee 
Services of Texas that demonstrated how critical good data is to developing or 
growing an earned revenue strategy. Data needs to collected constantly, quickly, 
and easily so that nonprofit administrators can test assumptions and make 
informed decisions throughout the development and growth of a social enterprise. 
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RST should make adopting a new legal case management software with 
customizable reporting capacity a high priority. It should use the ongoing support 
of its two Social Venture Partners (SVPs) to review and streamline current 
tracking spreadsheets so that they are consistent across sites, so that they allow for 
efficient data entry, and so that they collect the data needed to grow the program.  
2. Anticipate the impact on organizational culture. Refugee Services of Texas is 
adopting a social enterprise approach later in its organizational lineage (Addae, 
2018). Earned revenue is not part of the organization’s longstanding core service 
model, which is primarily comprised of comprehensive case management services 
for refugees and survivors of trafficking. Immigration legal services are, however, 
mission-integrated in that they directly benefit low-income immigrant and refugee 
clients and fulfill a critical community need. RST will need to decide how to 
communicate business-related decision making like price increases, staff structure 
changes, and a new focus on efficiency both within the organization and to 
external stakeholders. The impact that growing an earned revenue strategy can 
have on the organization’s culture and values was not an area of focus of RST’s 
Impact Academy partnership. However, as the immigration legal service program 
continues expand in size and revenue-generating capacity, RST’s leadership team 
will need to plan how it will communicate about the venture both internally and 
externally. It will need to anticipate any tension that may arise between the 
agency’s traditional direct service model and efforts to increase earned revenue. 
This will involve some combination of emphasizing the ways in which growing 
immigration legal services aligns with the agency’s mission, as well as possible 
strategies to incorporate innovation and entrepreneurship into the overall values of 
the organization. In communicating with volunteers, donors, and other 
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stakeholders, RST frequently emphasizes the ways in which its services help 
refugee clients achieve self-sufficiency. RST may be able to draw a comparison 
between the self-sufficiency it supports in its clients, and the increased financial 
self-sufficiency it will achieve by expanding fee-for-service revenues. RST should 
involve its attorneys and legal assistants in this dialogue and should emphasize the 
dual purpose of the program – fulfilling RST’s mission and raising revenue for 
the organization – when hiring new legal staff.   
3. Develop simple, tailored internal tool to navigate “mission-market tension.” 
As Young, Jung, and Aranson (2010) note, nonprofits adopting a new social 
enterprise model must navigate a “mission-market tension” in pricing and other 
key decisions. In RST’s case, adopting too high a price point for legal services 
limits the organization’s ability to serve vulnerable, low income clients; 
meanwhile, the organization’s current very low fee structure is one of the primary 
reasons why the program is not currently profitable. Adopting a fee schedule is 
not the only decision that will require RST to navigate the competing motives of 
mission fulfilment and profit maximization, and RST would benefit from a simple 
framework to guide these decisions. Future decisions may include: 
• The distribution of cases accepted by legal team (e.g. number of 
employment visas compared with number humanitarian claims such as 
Asylum); 
• Compensation for interpreters in a future language interpretation social 
enterprise; and 
• Customer groups targeted in marketing campaigns and outreach. 
RST should consider adapting Young, Jung, and Aranson’s (2010) 
“Mission/Market Scale for Pricing” tool (see page 23), or creating its own simple 
 57 
framework or rating system to assess both the financial and social impact of key 
decisions. This should be rooted in RST’s core values, service design, and 
mission, with the goal of promoting decisions that maintain mission alignment in 
commercial activities, while allowing current and future social enterprises to 
become profitable and grow.  
4. Plan for Personnel Needs Associated with Growing Social Enterprises. 
Mission Capital’s Impact Academy provided RST with structure and with the 
business expertise of five Social Venture Partners (SVPs). RST also had two 
graduate student interns whose placements aligned with the Impact Academy 
program. This increased the organization’s internal capacity to conduct research, 
build financial models, and design and implement a time and effort study. In order 
to continue to grow current and future earned income strategies, RST will need a 
skillset that it may not consistently have internally in its staff, including but not 
limited to market research; marketing and sales strategy; price analysis and 
financial modeling; and business planning. If RST hopes to expand social 
entrepreneurship substantially, it will eventually need to recruit staff members 
with these skills. It will need to consider whether to create a new position, or 
incorporate social entrepreneurship into existing roles in the organization, most 
likely in either its program operations or development teams. In the meantime, it 
must continue to find creative ways to access new skillsets by leveraging board 
member expertise; continuing to cultivate relationships with SVPs and other 
private sector volunteers; and continuing to seek capacity-building opportunities 
such as Impact Academy.  
5. Seek philanthropic funding and technical assistance to support growth. In all 
four comparison case studies, organizations relied on donations or grant funding 
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to implement and grow a social enterprise. Even organizations whose primary 
operating model is revenue generating continue to sustain and grow their 
programs with philanthropic support. Organizations implementing a new social 
enterprise need to be realistic about their capacity to develop and implement a 
new program, the start-up costs associated with a new earned income venture, and 
the timeline required to bring a planned initiative to scale. Refugee Services of 
Texas is already pursuing grant funding to subsidize new legal case management 
software. It should continue to identify opportunities to use grant funding, in-kind 
donations, volunteers, and other sources of support to grow its Immigration Legal 
Services program. In the future, RST should explore ways to establish new social 
enterprises with philanthropic support. It should look for grant opportunities 
related to capacity building, language access, or evaluation that align with the 
earned revenue opportunities identified in RST’s strategic plan. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
There is a growing body of research on nonprofit earned revenue strategies and 
social enterprises, but many gaps still remain. Empirical research is particularly limited, 
and most scholarly articles tend to draw qualitative data from cases studies. Much of the 
research focuses on conceptualizing and theorizing the hybrid nature of nonprofit social 
enterprises, which blend both commercial and social mission-based goals and activities. 
Several areas in particular warrant particular attention from future research on nonprofit 
earned revenue. First, future research is needed to build on existing methodological 
approaches to quantifying various aspects of nonprofit earned revenue strategies. Ecer et 
al. (2017) offer one promising approach with their calculation of “Share of Earned 
Income” (SEI) ratios, which measure revenue composition and compare program service 
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revenue to total revenue. Ecer et al. (2017) analyzed the impact of SEI ratios on various 
measures of efficiency. Future research could use a similar approach and examine the 
impact of higher SEI ratios on a variety of other outcomes, including other measures of 
financial health, program outcomes, and even measures of organizational culture like 
staff retention.  
Future research should also focus on developing measures for some of the 
conceptual themes that have emerged in theoretical and qualitative literature. Empirical 
methods could be developed to more rigorously test the impact of activity integration, or 
the differences between social enterprises whose social and commercial and activities are 
overlapping or blended and social enterprises whose social and commercial activities 
remain separate. Empirical methods could also be applied to Smith et al.’s (2010) “after 
conception” / “at conception” framework examining the point at which an earned income 
strategy was adopted within an organization’s history. Case studies suggest that this may 
be a key factor to consider in relation to organizational culture and staff and stakeholder 
buy-in.  
Access to sufficient financial capital was a key factor identified by Walske and 
Tyson (2015) that appears to limit many nonprofits’ ability to scale earned income 
projects. All five of the organizations examined in this report relied on some kind of 
philanthropic support or government funding to build and grow their respective social 
enterprises. Further research should explore the resources nonprofits need to launch a 
successful social enterprise, the various sources of funding that can support nonprofit 
social enterprise growth, and strategies for accessing capital. Walske and Tyson (2015) 
present a preliminary list of factors that contribute to social enterprises’ abilities to scale 
successfully, but their research focuses on both private and nonprofit social enterprises. 
Nonprofits have a unique ability to access philanthropic support, as well as free or low-
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cost technical assistance programs offered by organizations like Mission Capital. Future 
research is needed on the availability and impact of these various types of support, with a 
specific focus on the unique nonprofit operating context. 
A final key area of research is a deeper exploration of the ways in which 
organizational context impacts the successful development and growth of earned revenue 
strategies. Several factors emerged in the case studies, including leadership qualities such 
as flexibility and risk-taking; history; organizational culture; and service model. 
Researchers should also continue to develop indicators to measure organizational 
capacity, so that nonprofits can better understand and assess the resources they will need 















Refugee Services of Texas (RST) turned to earned revenue with the goals of 
improving the overall financial health of the organization, reducing reliance on 
government contracts in a challenging political environment, and providing a stable, 
unrestricted revenue stream. As RST is well aware, however, earned income alone will 
not alleviate its heavy reliance on government contracts. Earned income forms one part of 
a broader strategic plan to diversify revenues that also includes hiring new development 
staff, seeking grant opportunities through private foundations, increasing fundraising 
events, and continuing to cultivate a network of committed volunteers and individual 
donors.  
Both RST’s work with Impact Academy and the four comparison case studies 
clearly demonstrate that implementing a new social enterprise takes time and resources 
and is not a quick fix to financial challenges faced by an organization. Nonprofit social 
enterprises can take years to start generating profits and should be seen as an investment 
in the future financial health of an organization. Refugee Services of Texas was wise to 
build on an existing program before launching a brand-new enterprise, especially during 
a time when declining federal refugee resettlement levels are placing a strain on the 
organization’s resources. At the same time, RST has significant potential for growth in its 
earned income initiatives. Both immigration legal services and interpretation services 
meet a clear community need, are highly mission aligned, and directly benefit RST’s 
immigrant and refugee client base. As a statewide organization, RST has the added 
benefit of being able to pilot programs across one or two of its six offices before 
launching a wider expansion.  
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Government and philanthropic funders want to promote high quality, evidence-
based social services through their grant making processes. Yet, in some cases, restrictive 
contractual obligations and reporting requirements limit nonprofits’ ability to innovate. 
Many funding contracts allow little room for nonprofits to test new service models, adapt 
to changing environments, and explore creative approaches to social problems. While 
earned revenue is by no means a panacea when it comes to nonprofit financial health, 
under the right circumstances it can offer a flexible and sustainable revenue source. As 
nonprofits adapt to complex funding environments combined with increasingly complex 
social problems, earned revenue is a tool many organizations will consider. Policy 
makers have begun to explore approaches for supporting social enterprises through 
hybrid legal structures. Policy makers, government agencies, foundations, and 
researchers should continue to explore innovative funding models and legal structures to 
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